Here’s a radical idea: what if we actually fixed the Supreme Court instead of just complaining about it? After decades of watching justices hang onto their seats like medieval lords clinging to their fiefdoms, maybe it’s time to admit that lifetime appointments made sense in 1789 but are absolutely bonkers in 2025.
The current system is broken beyond repair. We have justices serving 30+ years, gaming their retirements to wait for the “right” president, and turning nominations into partisan bloodbaths. Meanwhile, the American people are stuck with the consequences of decisions made by people who were confirmed when most of us were still in diapers.
It’s time for term limits. And while we’re at it, let’s completely rethink how we structure the Court to actually serve democracy instead of whatever political party happened to be in power when someone died.
Why 18-Year Terms Make Perfect Sense
Let’s start with the obvious: 18-year terms with staggered appointments every two years. This isn’t some wild-eyed progressive fantasy—it has bipartisan support, with about two-thirds of Americans backing the idea. Senators Joe Manchin and Peter Welch just introduced a constitutional amendment calling for exactly this, and even President Biden endorsed the concept.
Here’s how it would work: every president gets exactly two Supreme Court appointments during a four-year term—one in their first year, one in their third year. No more, no less. No more lottery system where some presidents get three appointments while others get zero. No more strategic retirements where justices wait for their ideological soulmate to occupy the White House.
Eighteen years is long enough to ensure judicial independence—that’s longer than most people stay at any job. But it’s short enough that the Court actually reflects the will of the people within a reasonable timeframe, rather than being dominated by the ghosts of presidencies past.
Taking Nomination Power Away from Presidents
But here’s where we need to get really bold: the president should lose the power to nominate Supreme Court justices entirely. Trump’s abuse of this power—turning the Court into his personal political weapon—has shown us that we can’t trust presidents with this responsibility anymore.
Instead, Congress should handle nominations directly. Maybe through a bipartisan commission, maybe through a more formalized Senate process, but definitely not through the whims of whoever happens to occupy the White House. The Constitution gives the president nomination power, but constitutional amendments exist for exactly this kind of fundamental reform.
Think about it: we don’t let presidents pick their own prosecutors when they’re under investigation. Why do we let them shape the Court that might someday rule on their cases?
Two Structural Models: Counterbalance vs. Enhancement
Now for the really interesting part—how do we structure the ideological makeup of the Court? I’ve got two models that could actually work, each with very different philosophies.
Model 1: The Counterbalance Approach
Under this system, the Court would automatically lean opposite to the sitting president:
- Democratic president: 4 conservative justices, 3 liberal justices
- Republican president: 4 liberal justices, 3 conservative justices
Pros of the Counterbalance Model: This creates a built-in check on presidential power. No president could count on having a friendly Court to rubber-stamp their agenda. It would force more moderate, consensus-building approaches to governance because presidents would know they can’t rely on judicial bailouts for extreme policies. The Court would serve as a genuine restraint on executive overreach, regardless of party.
Cons of the Counterbalance Model: It could create constant conflict between the executive and judicial branches, potentially paralyzing government in critical moments. Presidents might feel their mandate is being undermined by an intentionally hostile Court. It could also lead to more activist judicial behavior as justices try to block presidential initiatives they disagree with.
Model 2: The Enhancement Approach
Under this system, the Court would tilt toward the sitting president’s ideology:
- Democratic president: 4 liberal justices, 3 conservative justices
- Republican president: 4 conservative justices, 3 liberal justices
Pros of the Enhancement Model: This ensures that elected presidents can actually implement their agendas without judicial obstruction. It respects the will of the voters who chose a particular direction for the country. It would reduce the political stakes around Court appointments since the balance would shift automatically with elections rather than depending on random deaths and retirements.
Cons of the Enhancement Model: It could lead to more extreme swings in judicial interpretation as the Court’s ideology shifts with each election. Minority rights might be less protected when the Court aligns with the political majority. It could also encourage presidents to push more extreme policies, knowing they have judicial backing.
The Realistic Timeline
Let’s be honest about something: this kind of reform isn’t happening tomorrow. Constitutional amendments require approval from two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states. That’s a massive lift in our polarized political environment.
But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t start now. Big changes take time—sometimes decades. The push for constitutional amendments often begins as seemingly impossible ideas that gradually gain momentum as people realize the status quo isn’t working.
We’re already seeing the beginning of this movement. The Brennan Center notes that “staggered 18-year terms would bring regular turnover to the bench” and create “a Court that better reflects prevailing public values”. Fix the Court points out that “life tenure has turned nominations into a political circus” where parties “scramble to find the youngest, often most ideological nominee” rather than the best qualified.
Why We Can’t Wait
The current system is destroying the Court’s legitimacy. Public trust has cratered, with about 4 in 10 Americans saying they have hardly any confidence in the Court, and 7 in 10 believing the justices’ decisions are motivated by ideology rather than fairness.
As Fix the Court notes, “Supreme Court justices now serve on average longer than at any point in American history (28 years) and are gaming their retirements”. This creates perverse incentives where justices cling to power past their prime, waiting for the “right” political moment to step down.
Meanwhile, the Court wields unprecedented power in a way that would have been “unrecognizable in the founding era,” with “a starkly different political and legal landscape in a nation of 330 million” that can “turn on the views of a single person”.
The Path Forward
My personal recommendation? Go with 18-year terms and the counterbalance model. Here’s why: we need the Court to serve as a check on political power, not an extension of it. The Enhancement Model might make governance smoother in the short term, but it would turn the Court into just another political institution that changes with the electoral winds.
The Counterbalance Model would force presidents to govern more moderately and build broader consensus for their policies. It would make the Court less political, not more, because justices wouldn’t be seen as loyal to the president who appointed them.
As for timing, let’s stagger the transitions over several presidential terms to avoid massive disruption. Start implementing the new system with the next set of appointments and gradually phase in the ideological balance requirements as current justices retire or reach their term limits.
Starting the Conversation
This is just the beginning of what should be a national conversation about Court reform. These aren’t perfect solutions—they’re starting points for serious discussion about how to save an institution that’s rapidly losing the trust of the American people.
The beauty of constitutional democracy is that we can change the rules when they stop working. The founders gave us the amendment process precisely because they knew they couldn’t predict every future challenge. Well, here’s our challenge: a Supreme Court that’s become too powerful, too political, and too disconnected from the people it serves.
We can fix this. But only if we’re willing to think big and act boldly. The current system is unsustainable—the only question is whether we’ll reform it ourselves or wait for it to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.
Time’s up for lifetime appointments. It’s time for term limits, structural reform, and a Court that actually serves democracy instead of dominating it. Let’s get started.
-The Centrist